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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE ENFORCEMENT
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-
MURPHY V. MOUNT CARMEL HIGH SCHOOL
The Fourteenth Amendment' guarantees the rights of due process and
equal protection, the privileges and immunities of federal citizenship,
and those fundamental rights incorporated into the amendment. Tradi-
tionally, this amendment applied only when state or local governments
participated in a deprivation of these rights. However, some courts have
allowed Fourteenth Amendment claims against purely private action by
relying on civil and criminal remedies enacted by Congress. This was
possible because Congress omitted the state action element2 in drafting
some of these statutes. This omission raises a serious constitutional
question: may Congress enforce Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
against private conduct?
In 42 U.S.C. §1985(3),' Congress provided a civil remedy for depriva-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 provides:
Sec. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5 provides:
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
This Note is concerned solely with Sections 1 and 5, which refer to rights of national
citizenship and Congress' authority to enforce the amendment.
2. Originating in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) the state action concept
highlights "the essential dichotomy set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment between
deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct,
'however discriminatory and wrongful,' against which the . . . amendment offers no
shield." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). Nevertheless,
seemingly private conduct has been deemed state action, and hence subjected to equal
protection, due process and other restrictions incorporated into the amendment under the
following circumstances: (a) when private action performs public functions; Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town could not restrict free speech); (b) where
state nexus with private conduct constitutes authorization or encouragement; Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S.1 (1948) (state court enforcement of restrictive racial covenant in prop-
erty deed). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 915-
96 (9th ed. 1975); Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions
to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (1970) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
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tions of rights by private conspirators. In the most recent Supreme
Court interpretation of this statute, Griffin v. Breckenridge,4 the Court
held that Congress intended §1985(3) to reach private conduct.5 In so
doing, however, the Court declined to reach the argument that private
action that infringes Fourteenth Amendment rights may be attacked
under §1985(3). Instead, the Court held that the rights infringed were
protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal right to travel
interstate.' Significantly, these constitutional sources authorize Con-
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws; or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force,
intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving
his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of
any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as
a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person
or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of.the object of such conspiracy, whereby an-
other is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
4. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
5. Id. at 104. In Griffin, a suit was brought by black plaintiffs who were assaulted on a
Mississippi highway. Their white assailants were charged with conspiring to deny plain-
tiffs' civil rights. The court outlined four essential allegations in upholding the plaintiffs'
§1985(3) complaint. These included: (1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving a
person or class of persons of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities; (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy which results in (4) an injury to person or property or
a deprivation of any right or privilege of federal citizenship. Id. at 102-03. The second
element above could be satisfied by requiring the plaintiff to show that "racial . . . or
. . . otherwise class-based . . . animus . . . motivated the conspiracy." Id. at 102. See,
e.g., Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973) (dismissing a §1985(3) action between
two newspaper chains for lack of a class-based animus or deprivation of any civil rights);
Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding a class-based animus between
supporters of political candidates); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 10 (4th Cir.
1972) (assault on pollution informers not motivated by a class-based animus); Furumoto
v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1286-87 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (no animus shown against Asian
students).
6. "We can only conclude that Congress was wholly within its powers under §2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment." Id. at 105. "The 'right to pass freely from state to state' has
been explicitly recognized as 'among the privileges of national citizenship.' [citation
omitted] That right . . . is within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legisla-
tion." Id. at 106.
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gress to regulate private as well as state activity.7 The Griffin court
avoided the question whether Congress could grant statutory protection
against private discrimination as a Fourteenth Amendment violation.8
The Supreme Court seemingly invited lower courts to supply a rationale
for allowing or denying the regulation of purely private action through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since the Griffin decision, a number of lower federal courts have
examined §1985(3) actions based on the Fourteenth Amendment., The
7. The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), that
the Thirteenth Amendment ban on racial discrimination could be enforced by Congress
against private conduct. Last term, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574
(1976), the Court held that statutes enforcing that amendment may prohibit racial dis-
crimination per se, whether white against black, black against white, or in any other
invidious form. Id. at 2585.
The federal right to travel interstate, at various times, has been based on the Privileges
and Immunities and the Commerce Clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971), it was protected against private
interference.
8. "More specifically, the allegations of the complaint have not required consideration
of the scope of the power of Congress under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 107.
9. The principal circuit court decisions based on the Fourteenth Amendment claims
evaluate the § 1985(3) remedy in terms of whether a cause of action against private conduct
can be sustained under the enforcement power of that amendment. For cases sustaining
such causes of action, see Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971) (uphold-
ing a First Amendment claim by citing Griffin); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235
(8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (enforcement power could reach private conduct); Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975) (enforcing a sex discrimination claim
through §1985(3), remanding issue whether a Title VII violation could be redressed under
§ 1985(3)); Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 211-12 (5th Cir. 1975), withdrawn
as moot, 507 F.2d 216 (1975); McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870
(5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 45 U.S.L.W. 2378 (Feb. 15, 1977) (en banc) (sustaining §1985(3)
under the commerce and bankruptcy power). Contra, Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508
F.2d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 1974); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (4th Cir.
1976); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High
School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976).
For a sample of district court decisions which have resolved the issue by adopting
rationale similar to the circuit decisions cited above, see Commonwealth v. Local Union
No. 542, IUOE, 347 F. Supp. 268, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (enforcement power can reach
discriminatory private acts); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 501 (W.D.
Pa. 1972) (sustaining First Amendment claims against a private employer); Brown v.
Villanova Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (sustaining First Amendment claims
against private employer); Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(sustaining equal protection claims against insurance company); Stern v. Massachusetts
Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 442-43 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (sustaining equal protec-
tion claim against insurance company). Contra, El Mundo, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Newspaper
Guild, Local No. 225, 346 F. Supp. 106, 113-15 (D.P.R. 1972); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp.
452, 464 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (quoting Dombrowski v. Dowling, supra, with approval).
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majority'0 of these courts enforce equal protection and free speech and
association claims against private interference. These courts" identify
a separate constitutional source of congressional power in the enforce-
ment clause which states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."'" Interpreting
the clause broadly, the majority finds that it grants Congress power to
expand Fourteenth Amendment protection to private as well as state
action. Therefore, these courts hold that when Congress omitted the
state action requirement in §1985(3), it defined one circumstance
wherein purely private conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
The minority view," on the other hand, is exemplified in several Sev-
enth Circuit decisions which hold that a state action allegation must be
present in the plaintiff's §1985(3) complaint if the suit is based on
Fourteenth Amendment claims. 5 The Seventh Circuit contends that
10. The Second, Third, Eighth and possibly Fifth Circuits have given a broad construc-
tion to the enforcement power. The First and Ninth Circuits have noted the conflict and
avoided ruling on the issue. See note 9 supra. Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924,
927 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1975) (finding no class-
based animus).
11. Few of the courts actually construe the enforcement clause, either because they
have been able to come within the Griffin rule or do not perceive the constitutional issue.
For the best discussions of the enforcement clause issue, see Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d
1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Local Union No. 542, IUOE, 347 F. Supp. 268
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
12. In the remainder of this Note, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment will be
referred to as the enforcement clause. The power which is therein granted to Congress will
be referred to as the enforcement power.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5.
14. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits are in the minority. For a discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's analysis, see note 76 infra.
15. Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Illinois
Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th
Cir. 1972).
Dombrowski was the first case in which the Seventh Circuit held that state action is
essential to Fourteenth Amendment claims. In that case, the plaintiff was an attorney who
had sought commercial office space from the defendant Arthur Rubloff, Inc. A rental
agent, Jack Dowling, showed Dombrowski a space in the Brunswick Building. When
informed that the plaintiff was a criminal defense lawyer, the agent refused to lease, due
to the potential "security risk" posed by plaintiff's primarily black and Latino clientele.
Dombrowski sued for injunctive relief under § 1985(3) and the public accommodation
statute, 42 U.S.C. §2000(a) (1970). In an unpublished decision, the district court enjoined
the defendant from leasing to anyone else.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the § 1985(3) counts and remanded the public
accommodation issue to the district court for additional determinations of facts. Judge
Stevens, writing for the court, reasoned that there were two possible state action require-
ments in Fourteenth Amendment suits. First, the statute providing a civil rights action
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the majority rule with respect to this statute is incorrect,"6 because the
enforcement clause does not contain "the necessary power"'" to apply
Fourteenth Amendment restrictions to private conduct. In Murphy v.
Mount Carmel High School, 1" the Seventh Circuit explicated its reason-
ing for finding a limited enforcement power.
This Note will explain how the Murphy court justified its interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and will review the strengths and
weaknesses of the Murphy rationale. Second, because the legal argu-
ments offered by both the minority and majority jurisdictions are inade-
quate, it will point out several policy reasons that support the Seventh
Circuit's position. Finally, this Note will explain what consequences
could follow if the Supreme Court resolves the constitutional question
by adopting the Murphy rationale.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 1 the Seventh Circuit con-
solidated two § 1985(3) cases brought by plaintiffs against private con-
spirators. In the first case, Daniel Murphy sought injunctive relief to
prevent being fired from the faculty of Mount Carmel High School, a
private secondary school. He alleged that the school's administration
sought his dismissal because he vociferously criticized the school's mi-
nority enrollment policy and the underrepresentation of blacks and
women on the school faculty. Hence, he claimed that sex-based and
racially motivated private action had conspired to interfere with his free
enacted under the amendment may contain a "color of state law" requirement, as in 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The court noted that Griffin made it clear that § 1985(3) does not contain
this element. However, another state action requirement appears in § 1 of the amendment
itself. Therefore, when pleading a denial of Fourteenth Amendment rights or rights incor-
porated against the states, the plaintiff must allege state action in such civil rights suits.
The Dombrowski decision relies on an unexpressed but crucial assumption. The Sev-
enth Circuit viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring state action in every in-
stance, despite the enforcement power. Thus, the court impliedly disapproved the theory
that Congress can regulate purely private conduct through the amendment. Nevertheless,
by failing to consider the enforcement power, the Dombrowski court engaged in an incom-
plete analysis. As a consequence, the court of appeals was forced to re-examine the
Dombrowski rule in Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School. The Murphy decision is signifi-
cant because it supplies a rationale for the approach begun, but left incomplete, in
Dombrowski. For a discussion of the Dombrowski rationale, see Note, Private Interference
with an Individual's Civil Rights: A Redressable Wrong Under §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment?, 51 NoTRE DAME LAw. 120 (1975).
16. Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1194 (1976).
17. Id.
18. 543 F.2d 1189 (1976).
19. Id.
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speech right that is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.' In
response, the district court issued a preliminary injunction for one year.
The following year, the same court dissolved the injunction and
dismissed Murphy's complaint for failure to allege state action."'
The second case was brought by Gerald Senese, an employee of a
privately operated hospital. He alleged that his right to associate with
non-union employees was abridged when union picketers conspired to
prevent him from working.2 The district court also dismissed his com-
plaint because of the absence of a state action allegation in his Four-
teenth Amendment claim.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed both district court decisions,
holding that a state action requirement must be read into §1985(3)
whenever the claim being asserted is based on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 2 The court supported its decision on two grounds. 4 It first
pointed out that no prior Supreme Court decision supports an interpre-
tation of the enforcement clause that grants Congress the power to regu-
late private conduct. Second, the court found that the legislative his-
tory of the amendment does not supply conclusive evidence of so expan-
sive an enforcement power. 6 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that
the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only
state action and does not give Congress authority to enforce the amend-
ment against purely private conduct.27
ANALYSIS OF THE Murphy RATIONALE
Supreme Court Decisions
The Murphy court supported its reasoning by extracting statements
20. Murphy is a white male. Ostensibly he was fired because he did not comply with a
faculty dress code which required him to wear a tie. The dress code was enacted just one
week prior to his dismissal. He asserted that the code was a "sham" for the real reason
he was fired. At the same time, the only black and women teachers at the school also were
fired. Brief for Appellant at 3, Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th
Cir. 1976). The Seventh Circuit did not resolve the issue whether Murphy had standing
to assert a discrimination claim as an advocate for these classes. Id. at 1192.
21. The district court's decision is unpublished.
22. This decision also is unpublished. The trial court noted that Senese did not meet
the Griffin requirement of alleging a "class-based animus." 543 F.2d at 1191. The Seventh
Circuit resolved the state action issue against Senese. Id. at 1195 n.8. Therefore the
animus" issue was left unresolved.
23. Id. at 1193.






from several SupremeCourt decisions that reviewed civil rights statutes
similar to the §1985(3) remedy. Particular emphasis was placed on the
assertion in United States v. Harris,"8 an 1882 decision, that a law
"directed exclusively against the action of private persons is not war-
ranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.""9 In Harris, the
Supreme Court dismissed an indictment which charged a white lynch
mob with assaulting, murdering, and thereby depriving blacks in the
custody of a deputy sheriff of equal protection of the laws."0 In so doing,
the Court held unconstitutional the statute authorizing a criminal in-
dictment against the private conspirators.3' The Harris Court decided
that although Congress could enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the
remedial legislation it might adopt could reach only state action. Signif-
icantly, the statute struck down in Harris was the exact criminal coun-
terpart to the §1985(3) civil remedy."
In addition to Harris, the Murphy court relied on Justice Stewart's
comment in United States v. Guest33 that the "Fourteenth Amendment
protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by
individuals. ' 3 This comment appeared in connection with his discus-
sion of the necessity of state action in a Fourteenth Amendment claim,
which he supported by citing the Harris decision.3 The Seventh Circuit
used this statement to support its determination that the enforcement
power could not be used to increase Fourteenth Amendment protection
by providing remedies against private action. Nevertheless, the
Murphy court's reliance on Justice Stewart's views in Guest can be
criticized because, taken as a whole, the Guest decision does not support
a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power.
In Guest, the Supreme Court reviewed 18 U.S.C. §24111 and an indict-
28. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
29. Id. at 640.
30. Id. at 629-32.
31. Id. at 638-39.
32. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 14 (codified at Rev. Stat. §5519 (1875))
(The statute was repealed in 1909 at 35 Stat. 1154).
33. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
34. Id. at 755, quoting United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id.
36. 543 F.2d at 1194.
37. The statute derives from §6 of the 1870 Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. §51 (1946).
As amended, it states:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
[Vol. 26:682
MURPHY v. MOUNT CARMEL
ment charging the defendant conspirators with harassing blacks and
depriving them of their civil rights.38 The Court found that the indict-
ment raised an equal protection claim in alleging the racially motivated
denial of equal access to public facilities. 9 The Court also specifically
held that the indictment had alleged state action. 0 Hence, because the
state action requirement was deemed satisfied, the focal statement
quoted by the Murphy court was, strictly speaking, dicta.
Moreover, in two concurring opinions, six justices objected to Justice
Stewart's comments on the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion. " Although concurring in the result, the justices offered their view
that Congress could go beyond state action in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to penalize private action.42 Justices Clark, Black, and Fortas
stated that the enforcement clause "empowers the Congress to enact
laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action."' 3 Justice
Brennan, with whom Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren con-
curred, defined the clause as "authorizing Congress to exercise its dis-
cretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for
all citizens."" These pronouncements by a majority of the Guest Court
may indicate that Murphy's narrow interpretation is incorrect, insofar
as it relies on the Guest decision.
The position of the majority of those circuits which have held that
private action may be regulated under the Fourteenth Amendment is
based largely on the Guest concurring opinions.45 The Murphy court
reached an opposite result by citing Harris and Justice Stewart's opin-
ion in Guest. Hence, the conflict between the circuits can be attributed
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for
any term of years or for life.
38. 383 U.S. at 747.
39. Id. at 753-57.
40. Id. at 756.
41. Id. at 761-62, 774-81.
42. Id. at 782.
43. Id. at 762.
44. Id. at 784.
45. The Guest concurring opinions are used to support a broad interpretation of the
enforcement power. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir.
1975); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Frantz, Federal
Power to Protect Civil Rights, The Price and Guest Cases, 4 LAw TRANS. Q. 63, 71 (1967).
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partially to the irreconcilable positions expressed in those two Supreme
Court decisions." The continued viability of the Harris precedent is
questionable because the Guest concurring opinions ignored this clear
precedent in defining a broad enforcement power.47 However, the rele-
vant portions of the Guest decision are dicta appearing in concurring
opinions. As a consequence, both the minority and majority positions
are undermined by the lack of dispositive precedent from the Supreme
Court concerning the constitutional scope of Congress' enforcement
power." Perhaps for this reason, the Seventh Circuit offered a second,
stronger basis for its ruling in Murphy.
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Some theorists contend that the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment granted Congress authority to penalize discrimination by
private individuals. Attaching special importance to the framers' in-
tent,' " these commentators reach this conclusion by analyzing the de-
bates surrounding the amendment's adoption." The majority of courts
46. The Harris decision is possibly no longer viable on its own facts, in light of Justice
Stewart's analysis of the Guest conspiracy. Both cases involved private groups that used
the presence of the state's law enforcement mechanism for their own illegal purposes. The
Harris mob assaulted and murdered the state's prisoners. The Guest conspirators caused
the arrest of civil rights workers by swearing out complaints. Unwitting participation of
state officers in such wrongful private conduct has been deemed state action by omission.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756 (1966), citing Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964). See also 1 C. ANTINEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574 (1969).
47. Other courts also have considered Harris a clear precedent in defining the scope of
the §1985(3) remedy. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 2378
(5th Cir. Feb. 15, 1977) (en banc), vacating 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1975).
48. Other broad pronouncements on Congress' enforcement power appear in inapposite
contexts. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) the Court stated:
Correctly viewed, §5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 651. The Court upheld federal legislation that superseded discriminatory state
voting requirements. Nevertheless, the scope of Congress' power to enforce the
amendment against private conduct is not necessarily the same as the power to correct
state legislation.
49. See H.E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 277 (1908); J. TEN-
BROECK, ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1957) (titled changed
to EQUAL UNDER LAW); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection
of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. Rzv. 131 (1950); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L.REV. 1323 (1952).
50. See, e.g., Frank & Munro, supra note 49, at 162-66; Gressman, supra note 49, at
1323-36.
51. For an excellent condensation of these debates, see B. SWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY
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which construe the enforcement power liberally support their reasoning
with this evidence.52 Thus, by finding a broad enforcement power, the
majority view applies a §1985(3) remedy in situations in which private
groups act because of racial prejudice or other invidiously discrimina-
tory motives.
The Seventh Circuit also reviewed this legislative history. Character-
izing this evidence as unpersuasive and inconclusive," the court refused
to give a broad construction to the enforcement clause. In so doing, the
Murphy court determined that existing legislative history is inadequate
support for a broad construction of the enforcement clause. It therefore
limited the enforcement power to creating remedies against state action.
The Murphy court's reasoning is supported by an implication arising
from the first reported draft of the amendment.5 Instead of being a
limitation on the states, the draft would have granted Congress a broad
power, comparable to the commerce power,5" to regulate discrimination
by individuals. The proposal read:
Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to
secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same
political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.56
Clearly, had the amendment been adopted in this form there would be
little question concerning congressional power to reach private conduct.
Therefore, the wording of the ratified amendment may reflect a choice,
forced by compromise, of an enforcement power limited to regulating
state action."
Additional support for the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is found in
Brown v. Board of Education.5" In deciding Brown, the Supreme Court
solicited studies of the framers' intent in enacting the Fourteenth
OF THE UNITED STATES (1970). The original resource material begins to appear in CONG.
GLOsE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 265 (1865) (first discussion of proposals to amend the Consti-
tution in light of the Civil War experience).
52. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1236 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc); Common-
wealth v. Local Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268, 292 n.36 (1972).
53. 543 F.2d at 1193-94.
54. See Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 331, 380-81 (1967).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
56. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 813 (1866).
57. Rep. Bingham offered an explanation of the change in the amendment's wording
that has given rise to the controversy whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the first eight amendments. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 20-21 (1949).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Amendment." After reviewing this information and the studies of some
of the authors subsequently relied on by the majority of lower courts
opposing Murphy, 10 Chief Justice Warren stated that the framers' intent
could not be determined conclusively from legislative history.' Because
the Brown decision indicates the unreliability of historical analysis in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Murphy court properly
refused to liberally construe the enforcement clause in reliance on this
evidence.
POLICY JUDGMENTS SUPPORTING THE MURPHY DECISION
The preceding discussion centered on the legal arguments courts have
used to construe the enforcement clause while defining the scope of the
§1985(3) remedy. Two analytical tools, legal precedent and legislative
history, are primary to both the minority and majority positions. Under-
lying the courts' legal analysis, however, is a vigorous debate concerning
the policy goals of the federal judiciary in addressing private discrimina-
tion. 2 By examining the kinds of claims that courts have addressed
under §1985(3), the policy choices made by the Seventh Circuit emerge.
This analysis reveals that the Murphy decision is sound for three rea-
sons: first, it underscores the policy of federalism; second, it prevents
§1985(3) from becoming a "general federal tort law," with its accompa-
nying burdens; finally, the approach taken in Murphy affords due
deference to congressional and state legislative schemes that regulate
59. There are three general views on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. First, the authors whose studies support the majority approach contend that the
framers' intent was to regulate private actions through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
note 49 supra. The second, opposing view is represented by Professor Avins, who feels that
the debates conclusively indicate that the regulation of private conduct was beyond the
reach of the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 54 supra. The
intermediate position, which finds the legislative history inconclusive as to the framers'
intent in enacting the amendment, is advocated by the Brown court and Professor Cox.
Cox, Foreward, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARv. L. Rv. 91, 110-11 (1966). For a review of the research methodology used in these
legal and historical interpretations, see Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REv. 368 (suggesting that all previous
attempts are deficient in one way or another and calling for another analysis by histori-
ans).
60. 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTONAL LAw 507, 863 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).
61. 347 U.S. at 489.
62. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v.
Local Union No. 542, IUOE, 347 F. Supp. 268, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (statute used to
broaden relief against labor violence). But see, El Mundo, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Newspaper
Guild, Local 225, 436 F. Supp. 106, 113-15 (D. P.R. 1972).
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private discrimination.
Three categories of discrimination claims have been the basis of
§1985(3) actions. The first category includes racial violence, similar to
that before the Supreme Court in Griffin. 3 In these suits, groups of
whites were charged with assaulting or murdering blacks. The federal
forum was chosen despite the availability of tort claims in state court.
By upholding these claims under the enforcement clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the majority approach permits non-racial class-
based minority groups to pursue actions against conspiracies in federal
court.' On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit view limits the use of
§1985(3), in this category, to address only racially motivated violence,
by sustaining the federal cause of action under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. The reasoning behind the Seventh Circuit's approach is that only
the strong federal policy against racial violence compels a shift of some
tort claims based upon violations of state criminal law to federal court.
This approach permits the "federalization" of only a narrow scope of
criminal acts, preserving state law as the basic means of redressing
criminal violence." This position is in harmony with a basic tenet of
federalism that the regulation of conduct between individual citizens is
a reserved power of the states."
The second category of claims involves private deprivations of First
Amendment rights."7 By allowing redress of these rights which are incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority approach en-
larges the number of permissible §1985(3) claims. For example, if an
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Local Union No. 542, IUOE, 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
64. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex).
65. The following hypothetical was offered by a draftsman of §1985(3):
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called a private
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against
another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men
for burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this
conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, if you
please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Vermonter, ... then
this section could reach it.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. 567 (1871). The hypothetical demonstrates that the
federal system could be unbalanced if a substantial number of these state court claims
were shifted to federal court.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimina-
tion: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 519-20 (1974).
67. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (freedom of religion);
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (free speech); Brown v. Villanova
University, 378 F.Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (free speech); Pendrell v. Chatham College,
370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (free speech).
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employee is fired for criticizing his employer's discriminatory policies,
the employee potentially has a tort claim in federal court under
§1985(3)M . The deprivation of his free speech right could be redressed if
the employee demonstrates that the dismissal resulted from a conspir-
acy motivated by a discriminatory animus. If claims of this nature can
be pursued, then new substantive rights based on the First Amendment
would be created. The Seventh Circuit approach recognizes that a sub-
stantial burden would be imposed on the federal judiciary, if these
claims could be addressed under §1985(3). The Seventh Circuit decided
that in order to prevent the creation of a "general federal tort law,""9
based on private infringements of free speech, association, or religious
rights, the enforcement power in the Fourteenth Amendment must be
limited.70
The third category of claims is comprised of employment discrimin-
ation actions. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act by eliminating several exemptions from the Act's coverage." This
enlarged the potential number of private suits for employment discrimi-
nation. The majority circuits also have alloved §1985(3) to be pleaded
as an additional federal right of action." In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
68. These are precisely the facts in Murphy. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text
supra. See Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
69. The fear that §1985(3) would become a "general federal tort law" was expressed in
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). See also Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d
190, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1972); Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1194-95
n.7 (7th Cir. 1976) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
70. The Seventh Circuit reached the constitutional issue and construed the enforce-
ment power in the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to prevent continued expansion of
the § 1985(3) remedy. Such expansion is inevitable because the statute was badly drafted,
vague and infinitely broad in its reach. Other courts, however, have been able to confine
the statute by requiring strict adherence to the elements set out in the Griffin decision.
See, e.g., Girard v. 94th Street & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing
Dombrowski v. Dowling in finding a failure to meet the conspiracy requirement); Hahn
v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1975); Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973).
The Fourth Circuit reaches the same result in §1985(3) actions as the Seventh Circuit,
but refuses to interpret the enforcement clause. It rules that regardless of what power
Congress may have as a result of the clause, §1985(3) was not clearly intended to exercise
that power. Hence, its position leaves the constitutional question for the Supreme Court
to decide. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (4th Cir. 1976). But cf.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-99 (1966) (holding that §1985(3) was intended to
reach private action).
71. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (1964), as amended by §2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. 11, 1972). For a summary of the changes, see 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2152-55. Governmental units and institutions of higher education are now subject to suit.
72. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Milner v. National
School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Brown v. Villanova Univ., 378
F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa.
1972).
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refuses to utilize the §1985(3) statute to redress discrimination in the
employment setting.73 If, for example, an employer is exempt from Title
VII coverage, then the Seventh Circuit does not permit an employee to
seek similar relief under the broadly worded, general remedy in
§1985(3). Because state and federal legislatures continue to enlarge
statutory protection and grant specific relief, the Seventh Circuit wisely
declines to cover the same ground in a case-by-case fashion. The effect
is to prevent the creation of a federal common law of employment dis-
crimination.7"
CONCLUSION
In Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School,"5 the Seventh Circuit ruled
that the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize
Congress to regulate private conduct. Thus, under §1985(3), the plain-
tiff has a federal cause of action only if state action deprives him of his
rights of equal protection, due process, or privileges and immunities.
The Murphy court recognized that its decision was in direct conflict
with that of a majority of circuits that have addressed the issue. 6 Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict and may affirm the
Murphy rationale if the Court is persuaded that the legal arguments and
policy choices offered by the Seventh Circuit are correct. Such a decision
would have two primary consequences. First, if Congress ever decided
to permit individuals to sue for discriminatory acts, it would have to
exercise a source of legislative authority other than the enforcement
power of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, by limiting the federal
power to regulate private discrimination, the Court would invite the
states to share responsibility for achieving the anti-discrimination goals
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, many states have moved to end
discrimination in housing, employment, and by private associations in
tandem with the federal government." This demonstrates that the fed-
eral system can continue to provide flexible solutions to human prob-
lems if permitted to do so.
Jeanne Beers
73. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975). Accord, Doski v.
M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976).
74. However, the same result was permitted by the Supreme Court with respect to
another statute from the Reconstruction Era, 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970). See McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574, 2585 (1976) (section sustained under Thir-
teenth Amendment). Accord, Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973).
75. 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976).
76. Id. at 1194.
77. An example is the administrative and judicial remedies afforded by state employ-
ment discrimination legislation. See, e.g., Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§851-67 (1975).
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